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When Are Studies Adequate
for Regulatory Purposes?
View of One Regulated
by Merle Bundy*
The question of adequacy ofstudies for regulatory purposes has been debated for years. Nine
questions need answers to determine adequacy: (1) Does the study deal with a defined problem
or a defined segment of it? (2) Do the study data justify the conclusions drawn? (3) Were
appropriate statistical analyses used? Is there evidence of bias versus objectivity in the
collection or analysis ofdata? (4) Does the study support, supplement (or complement) or refute
information in the literature? Is the study truly new information? (5) Does the study conform to
the Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group (IRLG) guidelines for documentation of Epidemiologic
Studies? (6) Does the study stand up to peer review? (7) Have other investigators been able to
confirm the findings by duplicating the study? (8) Is the study acceptable or can it be made
acceptable for publication in a reputable scientific journal? (9) Is the problem of such
magnitude or significance that regulation is required?
Because there is no such thing as a risk-free environment or absolute safety and there is no
definitive "yes" answer to each of the questions, the regulated would hope-yes, insist-that
the regulators exercise judgement with great skill in promulgation of rules or regulations. The
application of safety factors and the determination of acceptable levels ofrisk should be social
decisions.
A discussion of instances where the "regulated" believes that studies have not been adequate,
or others have been ignored, or misinterpreted for regulatory purposes is included. A method of
settling controversial questions to eliminate the litigation route is proposed. Judgment which
is so often eliminated by regulation needs to find its way back into the regulatory process. The
regulated recognize the need for regulations. However, when these regulations are based on less
than good scientific judgment, harm will be done to the regulatory process itself in the long
run.
The subject of this paper is one that others on
the side of the regulated might answer differ-
ently-all of us have our own built-in biases-and
I am no different.
"The great error has been in forming theories
upon observations or statements, without duly
inquiring whether they have been sufficiently nu-
merous, and have been carefully and truthfully
made, upon a uniform comprehensive plan, or
whether they are otherwise imperfect" (1). This
sounds, more than just vaguely, like what we are
talking about this morning. Yet this was an
expression of concern by Lemmuel Shattuck in
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1850, and still offers solid guidance to us in
attempting to determine what epidemiologic stud-
ies are adequate and justify regulations in the
conduct of the day to day operations of our
business enterprise.
Let me assure you that the steel industry is well
aware of at least 5700 different federal regula-
tions; 4000 of which are promulgated and enforced
by the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (OSHA) alone (2). An additional 26 federal
agencies are looking over our shoulders enforcing
the remainder. A few months ago there was some
relief, but precious little to the steel industry,
when OSHA revoked almost 1000 safety regula-
tions which had very little substance to them and
were, therefore, of little use in the safety field. On
67the other hand, most in industry recognize the
need for some regulation because of the nature of
man-not all live by the type of Judeo-Christian
principles that should eliminate the need for all but
the barest minimum ofregulation.
Dialogue such as this symposium will contribute,
I hope, to reducing some oftoday's hysteria to the
realism of our everyday experiences.
There are a number of questions that should be
asked and answered for us to decide if studies are
adequate for regulatory purposes. There are some
who might say they "never" can be adequate, but
this isjust as unreasonable a position as that taken
by those who say that the slightest hint, however
weak, is sufficient to require the regulatory pro-
cess to be initiated. I will list nine such questions.
1. Does the study deal with a defined problem or
a defined segment ofit?
2. Do the study data justify the conclusions
drawn?
3. Were appropriate statistical analyses used? Is
there evidence of bias versus objectivity in the
collection or analysis of data?
4. Does the study support, supplement (or
complement) or refute information in the litera-
ture? Is the study truly new information?
5. Does the study conform to the Interagency
Regulatory Liaison Group (IRLG) guidelines for
documentation of Epidemiologic Studies?
6. Does the study "stand-up" to peer review?
7. Have other investigators been able to confirm
the findings by duplicating the study?
8. Is the study acceptable or can it be made
acceptable for publication in a reputable scientific
journal?
9. Is the problem ofsuch magnitude or significance
that regulation is required?
The last question probably should be first,
because it leads into a discussion of a concept that
the regulated believe important. There is just no
such thing as a risk-free environment or absolute
safety. None of us would relish such a "cocoon".
Even insects "burst out" in order to survive. In
many instances, the decision-making process is
and should be a sociopolitical one rather than a
purely scientific evaluation. Despite their scientific
character, the application of safety factors and the
determination ofacceptable levels ofrisk should be
social decisions. Risk assessment, on the other
hand, is a science and art which should be engaged
in by those in a number of disciplines who know
what they are talking about. The voice of the
nonexpert has a place in sociopolitical decisions,
but we wouldn't expect a beginning catechism
class to establish church doctrine.
A second consideration of the regulated is the
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multiplicity of agencies who are intent on keeping
their "power" base, saying "We must carry our the
mandate of the law." There is some promise of
reducing some of the overlapping and occasionally
confficting regulations of the past with the forma-
tion ofthe Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group.
This will be particularly true iftesting procedures
and requirements are accepted by all agencies. A
problem is created if some agencies require differ-
ent test procedures, even if all might be equally
acceptable from a standpoint of quality control.
These differences cause confusion and unnecessary
costs by requiring somewhat different tests having
the same objectives though based on separate laws
and regulations.
Returning to the task at hand, the search for a
definitive answer to the question of when studies
are adequate for regulatory purposes, there is, of
course, no easy answer. If all above listed ques-
tions can be answered in the affirmative, then the
regulated would agree that the study or studies
can be considered adequate for regulation. The
"rub", however, comes when we lack affirmative
answers. The appeal of the regulated is that
judgment be exercised with great skill in these
instances.
With some trepidation, let me venture into some
areas where the "regulated" believe that some
studies have not been adequate, or others have
been ignored, or misinterpreted, for regulatory
purposes. The carcinogen debate is a good exam-
ple. Schwartz (3) has observed that much of the
emotional panic about current cancer statistics has
been caused by misinterpretation of the available
data. It is true that the deaths in the United
States from malignancies are increasing (from
351,000 in 1973, they rose to 396,000 in 1976);
however, this increase and the related rise in
cancer death rates are explained in large part by
the aging of the American population. Before age
adjustment, there is an apparent increase in can-
cer death rate ofmore than 12% from 1968 to 1978.
When the mortality data are age-adjusted, howev-
er, the cancer death rate is shown to have in-
creased only 2.5% between 1968 and 1978. When
age-adjusted figures are further corrected to elim-
inate the contribution of smoking-induced lung
cancers, there has been no increase in the average
annual mortality rate for men, and a 0.7% de-
crease for women (4).
Commenting on the alleged "cancer epidemic" in
the United States in an address at the dedication
in 1979 of the Northwestern University Cancer
Center, Philip Handler (5) observed: "There is no
such epidemic. The age-corrected incidences of
only two forms of cancer have altered significantly
Environmental Health Perspectivesin our lifetime. Bronchiogenic carcinoma due to
cigarette smoking has risen sharply, and the
incidence of primary gastric carcinoma has de-
clined dramatically for entirely unknown reasons.
These two have more or less offset each other and
the age-corrected incidence rate for the total of all
forms of cancer has remained approximately con-
stant for half a centurn."
Writing in the EPA Journal John Higginson,
Director, International Agency for Research on
Cancer, offered a similar opinion (6): ". . . available
cancer data provide no evidence of a new cancer
epidemic, apart from tobacco-related tumors."
Higginson (7) recently observed in an interview:
"It would be so easy to be able to say 'let us
regulate everything to zero exposure and we have
no more cancer.' The concept is so beautiful that it
will overwhelm a mass of facts to the contrary."
Unfortunately, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has succumbed to this simplistic
approach in the proposed air carcinogens policy
and procedures. While the Agency recognizes that
air pollution is just one of several "environmental
factors" that contribute to the overall cancer
incidence (8) EPA has made no attempt to esti-
mate the relative effects of these factors. Several
distinguished epidemiologists, however, have in-
dependently performed this epidemiologic exer-
cise. Their conclusions have been remarkably sim-
ilar.
Wynder and Gori (9-11) have estimated that diet
and tobacco smoking account for almost 80% ofthe
cancer incidence in this country. Radiation, alco-
hol, and occupation were judged to be minor
contributors. Higginson (12) and Doll (13) have
argued that the lowest reported cancer rates are
baseline or "natural" rates and that "environmen-
tal influences" are responsible for any increases
from these baseline figures. Higginson's (7) best
estimates for the proportion of cancers attribut-
able to various environmental factors are as fol-
lows: lifestyle (including diet and cultural pat-
terns), 30% for females to 63% for males; to-
bacco/alcohol, 10% for females to 35% for males;
sunlight, 10%; occupation, 2% for females to 6%
for males; radiation, 1%; iatrogenic, 1%, congeni-
tal, 2%; and unknown etiology, 11% for females
and 15% for males. Demopoulos (14, 15) reported
that a group of independent university scientists
from the comprehensive and specialized cancer
centers in this country had reached the following
consensus on the predominant causes of cancer:
smoking, 35%; diet, 45%; occupational factors, 5%;
radiation, 3%; preexisting medical disorders, 2%;
iatrogenic, 1%; and unknown, 9%.
It is truly rare when the above facts are
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presented in their entirety or given full weight in
regulatory discussions on the etiology of cancer.
Instead, the frequently stated notion that 80% to
90% of all cancer is of environmental origin has
been improperly linked to the view that cancer is
largely a result of population exposures to indus-
trial chemicals. EPA and other regulatory agen-
cies must reject this suggestion. As Handler (5)
has said: "Several hundred chemical compounds
have been . .. examined in the last few years and
a considerable fraction bound to be both mutagenic
and carcinogenic. Nevertheless, we should lay to
rest the idea that it is these man-made compounds,
abroad in the land, that are responsible for the fact
that 25 percent of Americans die of cancer. They
are not. The possible effects of all known man-
made chemicals, when totalled, could contribute
only a miniscule fraction of that total of all
carcinogenesis in our population. As I noted earli-
er, current age-corrected incidence rates are much
what they were before most of these chemicals
were introduced into our surroundings. They cer-
tainly cannot account for the even higher, age-
corrected cancer rates in some more primitive
countries which do not yet enjoy the benefits of a
diverse chemical economy...."
The possibility that air pollution might be a
significant factor in the development of human
cancer was first considered nearly 50 years ago
(16, 17). Numerous studies in the intervening
years, however, have failed to support this hy-
pothesis.
It is clear that an urban-rural gradient in
mortality statistics exists for certain specific can-
cers. There is no convincing evidence, however,
that this "urban factor" is related to air pollution.
Waller (16) has suggested that the differences in
smoking habits between city and country account
for the observed trend in mortality statistics: ". . .
the present situation may be a legacy of lower
levels of cigarette smoking in rural areas thirty or
more years ago, even though current habits are
similar in town and country."
Other investigators have reached similar conclu-
sions. In a recent report, Doll (18) notes that the
"urban factor" probably accounts for less than 5
deaths per 100,000 in the absence of cigarette
smoking. Goldsmith (19) has recently presented
evidence that most of the so-called "urban factor"
in cancer rates can be accounted for by differences
between urban and rural residents in smoking
habits and occupation. Goldsmith's analysis re-
vealed the following facts, which, he said, led him
to conclude that air pollution plays little, if any,
role in causing cancer:
* If air pollution were responsible, the excess
69cancer incidence should be greatest in those
states and countries where there is the heavi-
est urban pollution, but it is not.
* The largest, most polluted cities should have
the highest lung cancer rates, but they do not.
* Lung cancer rates should be higher among
those who have lived their entire lives in
cities, but it is not. Rather, migrants to urban
areas have higher rates than lifetime resi-
dents.
* The effect on lung cancer rates should be the
same for both men and women, but it is not.
Demopoulos (14, 15) has also presented evidence
that air pollution is not an important cause of
cancer in urban areas. In a study of seven indus-
trial American cities with vastly different levels of
air pollution, he found that lung cancer incidence
was no more common in cities characterized as
"dirty" (Detroit, Pittsburgh and Birmingham) than
in the "clean" cities of Atlanta, San Francisco,
Dallas and Minneapolis.
Hammond (20) has analyzed the American Can-
cer Society's prospective data on males living 10 or
more years in their present area. No significant
difference was found in lung cancer mortality in
relation to either residence or population size of
residential area. Furthermore, when data were
standardized by age and tobacco consumption, and
occupational exposures were excluded, urban pol-
lution was not found to be an etiologic factor in
lung cancer risk.
Lawther (21) has considered the possible magni-
tude of effects of exposure to the normal concen-
trations of benzo(a)pyrene in urban air. He con-
cluded that public exposure to this carcinogen in
urban air pollution has no clearly discernible effect
on lung cancer mortality: "Thus it seems even
more unlikely that this factor has any important
bearing on lung cancer mortality in the general
population today, and there is little doubt that
variations in smoking habits are of paramount
importance in determining variations in lung can-
cer mortality between subgroups of the popula-
tion...."
Higginson (7) has aptly summarized the non-
relationship between pollution and cancer: "The
dangers of point-source pollution are well recog-
nized, but you cannot explain much of existing
cancer patterns only in terms of simple general
pollution by industrial chemicals in low doses. You
can't explain why Geneva, a non-industrial city,
has more cancer than Birmingham in the polluted
central valleys of England. In the United States,
reports are coming out that there are few differ-
ences in cancer patterns between the so-called
dirty and clean cities. In fact, the only thing you
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can say is that air pollution may, and I emphasize,
MAY, increase lung cancer in cigarette smokers.
These and other epidemiologic discrepancies sim-
ply cannot be explained by variations in general
pollution. Some can, however, be explained by
differences in life-style. . . . (This simplistic
approach) has prevented possible acceptance ofthe
idea that there may be doses ofcarcinogens which,
for practical purposes, are unimportant...."
In summary, therefore, despite attempts by
several eminent epidemiologists to correlate can-
cer incidence/mortality and general air pollution, a
consistent relationship between these variables
has never been established. Instead, the over-
whelming body of scientific evidence supports the
conclusion that dietary factors and cigarette smok-
ing are, by far, the major contributors to overall
cancer incidence. If this fact is recognized and
accepted, the resources of federal regulatory and
research bodies can be best utilized in the public
interest.
As Frank Rauscher, Vice President, American
Cancer Society, observed, "I don't see how people
can point to the smoke stacks and blame industry
when they ignore what they have between their
fingers. We know what causes 70 percent of all
cancers, and we have known that for about 10
years."(22).
While still speaking of carcinogenesis, the im-
portance of potency should be emphasized. Regu-
latory agencies tend to ignore differences in the
potency of chemical carcinogens. While exposures
at the lowest technically feasible level would not
be identical for all chemicals, the universal applica-
tion ofthe most drastic remedy ignores the practi-
cal reality that carcinogens differ greatly in poten-
cy, and that different levels of control, not always
the lowest level feasible, are appropriate (23). It
ignores, for example, the 10,000-fold differences
between a threshold limit value for chloroform, a
weak carcinogen, and bischloromethyl ether, a
strong one. It is not unfair to suggest that this is
roughly equivalent to arguing that because the
elephant and the mouse are both mammals, the
same chains are required to prevent their escape.
The public at large ought to be informed of
widely different potencies. If they are going to be
told that aflatoxin and saccharin are both carcino-
gens in animals, they ought at least to know that
there appears to be a one millionfold difference in
potency between the two.
Aflatoxins (24) are naturally occurring contami-
nants of such common foods as peanuts, corn and
grain. In spite of their potent carcinogenicity, 15
ppb amounts ofaflatoxins aretolerated inthe food sup-
ply because they are not deliberately added to foods.
Environmental Health PerspectivesSwitching briefly to the sulfur oxides and the
controversy surrounding their regulation, Weir
(25) states: ". . . neither the animal studies, the
clinical investigations nor the industrial experi-
ences agree with the recently reported community
epidemiological studies that are currently receiv-
ing attention. It may well be that the toxicological
data are correct in that there are no important
long-term effects from exposure to the sulfur
oxides. Certainly the laboratory studies, animal or
human, do not support more stringent standards
for either the occupational or the community
environment."
An example where an agency, the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA), apparently has re-
lied on a study that has not withstood the peer
review process was noted when controversy ex-
ploded in the recent EPA cancellation hearings on
the herbicide 2,4,5-T. Blair (26) has charged that
2,4,5-T is being victimized by an agency which has
expended too many man-hours and tax dollars to
admit now that the herbicide is safe when used
properly. Furthermore, he cited EPA's denial of
its own Scientific Advisory Panel's decision as an
indicator of the Agency's preconceived political
objective. Most uses of 2,4,5-T and a related
herbicide, silvex, were suspended in February,
1979 after EPA received reports that an abnor-
mally high number of allegedly TCDD-related
miscarriages had occurred in isolated spray areas
in the northwest. TCDD is a trace dioxin contami-
nant ofthese herbicides. The international scientific
community has rejected the EPA's Alsea II (Ore-
gon) study on which the suspension was largely
based. The Scientific Advisory Panel in EPA
concluded after extensive review of the data that
no evidence of an immediate or substantial hazard
to human health or to the environment associated
with the use of 2,4,5-T or silvex on rangeland,
rice, orchards, sugar cane and the noncrop uses
specified in the decision documents was found.
So that you will not think that this type of
controversy occurs just in the environmental pol-
lution area, I need only mention the controversy
concerning the University Group Diabetes Pro-
gram (UGDP) (27) report on the use of oral
hypoglycemics in the treatment and management
of adult-onset diabetes.
The leukemia controversy in benzene exposure
levels of around 10 ppm is an example where an
agency (OSHA) has relied upon a study (28) that
has been severely criticized by peer groups but
has ignored excellent studies (29-31) which did not
support OSHA's reliance on the critcized study
conducted by Infante, et al. (28) of the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH). In addition, another nearby plant, which
should have been and could have been studied,
would not have supported the contention that
benzene in these low level exposures is a leukemo-
gen. Since no new cases of leukemia are occurring
in the studied plant, the likelihood of the "cluster"
phenomenon unrelated to occupational exposure
originally suggested by many of the peer critics is
gaining more stature.
Scientists in the government should acknowl-
edge the views of reputable peer groups. It has
been proposed that a "blue-ribbon" panel of scien-
tists, independent of those who do the regulating
as well as ofthose who are to be regulated, be put
into place preferably in the National Academy of
Sciences to evaluate data in the decision making
process of government regulation of carcinogens
(32). It would seem to the regulated that this
practice might assure that indeed regulation of
carcinogens would not be based at times on the
product of bureaucratic interpretation. If this
practice proved to be a workable procedure, then
the natural expansion to other areas of govern-
ment regulation would be appropriate at least,
where controversy rears its head. Not everyone
would be totally satisfied, I'm sure, but this would
be much better than the litigation route that must
be resorted to today to bring reason into the
process.
In closing, I would like to reemphasize the
difficulty in providing a definitive answer to the
question of when a study is adequate for regula-
tory purposes. Judgment which is so often elimi-
nated by regulation needs to find its way back into
the regulatory process. The balancing of risk and
potency requires the best scientific judgment avail-
able to prevent overkill and over regulation. I
suspect that some will think I have spent too much
time using examples where regulations or pro-
posed regulations are based on less than good
scientific judgment-but I submit that in the long
run, bad regulation will do great harm to the
regulatory process itself.
Let me assure you in the strongest terms that
the regulated do not wish to count bodies-as has
been stated by some of our critics-but we do
want to be sure that the regulations we must live
with are the best that good judgment can produce
based on sound scientific input.
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